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Abstract—We consider a non-stochastic privacy-preserving
problem in which an adversary aims to infer sensitive information
S from publicly accessible data X without using statistics. We
consider the problem of generating and releasing a quantization
Xˆ of X to minimize the privacy leakage of S to Xˆ while
maintaining a certain level of utility (or, inversely, the quanti-
zation loss). The variables S and X are treated as bounded and
non-probabilistic, but are otherwise general. We consider two
existing non-stochastic privacy measures, namely the maximum
uncertainty reduction L0(S → Xˆ) and the refined information
I∗(S; Xˆ) (also called the maximin information) of S. For each
privacy measure, we propose a corresponding agglomerative clus-
tering algorithm that converges to a locally optimal quantization
solution Xˆ by iteratively merging elements in the alphabet of
X . To instantiate the solution to this problem, we consider
two specific utility measures, the worst-case resolution of X by
observing Xˆ and the maximal distortion of the released data Xˆ .
We show that the value of the maximin information I∗(S; Xˆ)
can be determined by dividing the confusability graph into con-
nected subgraphs. Hence, I∗(S; Xˆ) can be reduced by merging
nodes connecting subgraphs. The relation to the probabilistic
information-theoretic privacy is also studied by noting that the
Ga´cs-Ko¨rner common information is the stochastic version of I∗
and indicates the attainability of statistical indistinguishability.
Index Terms—Privacy, Information Leakage, Non-stochastic
Information Theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS we share and exchange data with others reg-ularly while being increasingly concerned about whether
our personal data is well protected. In particular, in this big
data era, advances in efficient data analytics have improved
an adversary’s ability in obtaining individuals’ private infor-
mation [1]. For example, machine learning models with high
accuracy can potentially reveal individual labels of the training
data as in the case of membership information attacks [2]. In
these cases, the privacy attack can happen during the legitimate
use of data, e.g., querying the dataset, survey report, and
speech recognition, without direct access to confidential data.
Thus, the meaning of privacy has moved far beyond its original
definition in [3] and cannot be achieved by just ‘anonymizing’
or ‘secluding’ the sensitive data from release.
For a user in the public domain who is interested in
the aggregated statistics and interacts with a data curator
using queries, the differential privacy (DP) [4] provides a
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mathematical definition for the privacy loss: an upper bound
on how the statistics of sanitized/randomized responses to a
query change with and without an individual’s record. By
replacing query response with data mining, e.g., maximum
a posteriori estimate, DP can be tuned to a privacy measure
in statistical inference problems, e.g., in machine learning [5],
[6]. While DP is concerned with the individual indistinguisha-
bility of the released data, privacy in information theory [7]–
[9] refers to the exact amount (e.g., the number of bits) of
sensitive information that is leaked to the public. This enables
study of privacy-utility tradeoff (PUT) via the problem of
minimizing the privacy leakage subject to a constraint on the
utility/usefulness of the released data.
In statistical data mining, unknown quantities are conven-
tionally treated as random variables, measurable functions that
map the probability space to the event space. As a result,
privacy is usually measured as a stochastic feature using,
e.g., the mutual information in [7] or the Re´nyi divergence1
in [4], [9]. However, in some practical applications, it may
be preferred to measure and optimize privacy or information
leakage in a non-stochastic setting. For instance, consider
the problem of releasing a table of just 50 records. The
size is not large enough for making probabilistic inference
about the population2. The data curator’s concern could be
whether an adversary can gain private information that is
not based on statistics. Kolmogorov had partly answered this
question in his early study [11] stating that the more values of
sensitive data appears concurrently with the released data, the
less certain an adversary is about the sensitive data. This is
also an information-theoretic interpretation of the k-anonymity
[12] and motivated the adoption of non-stochastic privacy
metrics [13], [14]. Non-stochastic treatment of variables and
measures of information have proved popular in other engi-
neering domains, such as networked control and estimation in
which variables might be bounded but do not follow a well-
defined probability distribution [15]–[18].
In this paper, we study how to preserve privacy against non-
stochastic inference, where the adversary is able to deduce
non-statistical features of the data while both privacy and
utility are measured by non-probabilistic information quan-
tities. Specifically, for a data curator who wants to share non-
1DP can be defined as the supremum of the Re´nyi divergence
Dα(p(·)‖q(·)) for α =∞ [10].
2This could be the case in a small experiment or at the beginning of data
release in a gradual data release setting. For example, in small datasets, each
row of a tabular dataset is often distinct and the information only depends
on the range, the number of distinct values, and not probabilities or statistics.
We show an example of this situation in Section VII-B.
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sensitive data X with the public, but to protect the sensitive
data S that is related to X , the problem can be cast as
generating a sanitization Xˆ with a specified level of the data
fidelity/utility while leaking the least amount of information
about S. Based on non-stochastic information theory, two
privacy measures are considered: L0(S → Xˆ) capturing
the information on S conveyed by Xˆ [13] and the maximin
information I∗(S; Xˆ) measuring the adversary’s knowledge
on S refined by Xˆ [15]. We reveal different interpretations in
privacy between these two measures: L0(S → Xˆ) measures
the maximum uncertainty reduction on S at the adversary side,
which is shown to correspond to k-anonymity, while I∗(S; Xˆ)
measures how distinguishable S can be by observing Xˆ , or
how much private information can be obtained without error
by the adversary.
We consider the privacy-preserving problem by generating
Xˆ that minimizes the privacy leakage, L0(S → Xˆ) or
I∗(S; Xˆ) subject to maintaining the utility U(X; Xˆ) of the
released data above some threshold. The non-stochastic sani-
tization Xˆ is done by a quantization method, or a deterministic
clustering of the alphabet of the public data X . To this
end, we propose a greedy clustering algorithm for extracting
a locally optimal solution Xˆ by iteratively merging two
elements of X that strictly reduces the Lagrangian function
of the privacy-preserving problem. We show that the value
of the maximin information I∗(S;X) is determined by the
maximum number of disconnected subgraphs in an undirected
uncapacitated graph, which is equivalent to the confusability
graph for the study on Shannon’s zero-error capacity [19].
Therefore, the proposed agglomerative clustering algorithm
for minimizing I∗(S; Xˆ) is analogous to a subgraph merging
process. To instantiate the solution to the problem, we study
two specific utility measures for U(X; Xˆ): the minimum
uncertainty reduction I0(X → Xˆ), the worst-case resolution
of the public data X via the released data Xˆ [15], and the
maximum distortion maxx,xˆ d(x, xˆ) of the sanitized data Xˆ .
We also investigate the relationship between our work and
the stochastic information-theoretic privacy studies in [7]–
[9]. We elaborate that the Ga´cs-Ko¨rner common information
[20] is the stochastic version of the maximin information,
indicating when statistical indistinguishability, e.g., the DP [4],
is attainable.
Finally, we show how to apply the proposed agglomerative
clustering algorithm to plot the Pareto frontier, where one can
directly search for a privacy-preserving data sanitization solu-
tion for any given utility constraint. We also run experiments
on a real-world dataset to show that the proposed agglom-
erative clustering algorithm is capable of realistic/practical
privacy-preserving sanitization.
Related works: For a continuous sensitive variable S, the
problem of designing the quantization f(S) and its sanitiza-
tion fˆ(S) to minimize the privacy leakage L0(S → fˆ(S))
or I∗(S; fˆ(S)) subject to an upper bound on the `2-norm
‖f(S)− fˆ(S)‖2 was investigated in [13]. This reduces to the
privacy preserving problem in this paper when X = f(S).
This paper generalizes the framework of [13] as there is no
requirement that X is a deterministic function of S. Moreover,
the difference between L0(S → fˆ(S)) and I∗(S; fˆ(S)),
the graph decomposition method for determining I∗(S; f(S))
and its role in minimizing I∗(S; fˆ(S)) are not discussed in
[13]. The setup of this paper matches the typical setting in
statistical inference3 and is adopted in most of the stochastic
information-theoretic privacy studies [7]–[9] (see Section VI).
Organization: This paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews some definitions in non-stochastic information theory.
Section III introduces privacy measures L0 and I∗. Section IV
proposes a graph decomposition method for determining I∗. In
Section V, we formulate the non-stochastic privacy-preserving
problem and propose two agglomerative clustering algorithms.
Section VI studies the relationship between our work and the
stochastic information-theoretic privacy. Section VII presents
the experimental results.
II. NON-STOCHASTIC INFORMATION THEORY
In non-stochastic information theory [15], for the sample
space Ω, we say that the mapping X : Ω → X is an
uncertain variable (uv). For a sample ω ∈ Ω, X(ω) denote
a realization of the uv X . The notation X(ω) is simplified
to X in the rest of the paper if the context is clear. When
X is a finite set, X is a discrete uv. In this paper, we only
consider discrete uvs. Here, a uv differs from the a random
variable (rv) in probability theory in that we do not assume
a σ-algebra subset family over the sample space Ω or a
probability measure over this subset family. For a pair of
discrete uvs S and X , let JS,XK , {(S(ω), X(ω)) : ω ∈ Ω}
and JS|xK , {S(ω) : X(ω) = x, ω ∈ Ω}, respectively, be the
joint range of S and X and the conditional range of S based
on the observation that X = x. Note, we can rewrite JS,XK =⋃
x∈JXK (JS|xK× {x}) and JS|XK = {JS|xK : x ∈ JXK}. We
say that S and X are independent, if JS|xK = JSK,∀x ∈ JXK.
For JS,XK, we have the marginal ranges JSK and JXK. The
non-probabilistic entropy of a uv X is defined as
H0(X) , log |JXK|,
which coincides with the Hartley (maximum) entropy [21] or
the Re´nyi entropy Hα in the case α = 0 [22]. We assume the
base of all logarithms is 2 in this paper.
III. NON-STOCHASTIC INFERENCE AND LEAKAGE
The sensitive/private data is denoted by S. Consider the case
where a data curator wants to release X to the public, which is
related4 with S. For example, the taxation office may want to
release the income records, which, even if anonymized, could
be observed by an adversary in the public domain to infer
individuals’ identities. The data curator needs to maintain a
certain level of usefulness/utility of the released data, e.g., to
the ensure correctness of answers to legitimate surveys/queries.
At the same time, the curator has privacy concerns in the
sense that the more fidelity the released data has, the easier
3Statistical inference considers the situation where a user/adversary is plan-
ning to deduce properties S of a population X based on noisy observations
Xˆ , where the statistics of the population X is usually given or specified.
4Relatedness, similar to correlation in the probabilistic sense, states thatJS|xK = JSK does not hold for all x ∈ JXK, or S and X are not non-
stochastically independent uvs.
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an adversary can infer the private data S. Thus, it is necessary
for the curator to be equipped with a valid privacy measure to
anticipate the risk of the information leakage.
A. Uncertainty Reduction
For any realization x of the public data X , Kolmogorov
defined a ‘combinatorial’ conditional entropy as log JS|xK
in [11]. This interprets the uncertainty/entropy reduction
log(|JSK|/|JS|xK|) as a measure of non-stochastic information
on S gained by an adversary in the public domain after
observing x, or the privacy leakage at the data curator side
by releasing x. For the conditional information in the sense
of the maximum entropy H0(S|X) , maxx∈JXK log |JS|xK|,
the author in [15] proposed the non-stochastic 0-information
as the minimal difference between prior and posterior entropy
I0(S → X) , H0(S)−H0(S|X) = min
x∈JXK log
|JSK|
|JS|xK| .
However, in [13], it was suggested to consider the worst-case,
i.e., the minimal posterior entropy/uncertainty B0(S|X) ,
minx∈JXK log |JS|xK|, to quantify the maximal information
leakage
L0(S → X) , H0(S)−B0(S|X) = max
x∈JXK log
|JSK|
|JS|xK| .
as a measure of privacy.
B. Maximin Information/Indistinguishability
Note that neither I0 or L0 is symmetric. That is, I0(S →
X) = I0(X → S) or L0(S → X) = L0(X → S) do not hold
in general. However, a symmetric measure of the dependence
between S and X can be defined based on the concept of
overlap partition.
Definition 1 (Overlap Partition [15, Definitions 3.1 and 3.2,
Lemma 3.1]).
(a) overlap connectedness: A pair s, s′ ∈ JSK is JS|XK-
overlap connected, denoted by s ! s′, if there exists
an ordered finite sequence (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ JXKn such that
s ∈ JS|x1K, s′ ∈ JS|xnK and JS|xiK ∩ JS|xi+1K 6= ∅
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Thus, s! s,∀s ∈ JSK and
s ! s′,∀s, s′ ∈ JS|xK, x ∈ JXK. A subset S ⊆ JSK isJS|XK-overlap connected if s! s′,∀s, s′ ∈ S;
(b) overlap isolation: Two subsets S,S ′ ⊆ JSK are JS|XK-
overlap isolated if there does not exist s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S ′
such that s! s′;
(c) overlap isolated partition: A partition of JSK is a JS|XK-
overlap isolated partition, denoted by PJS|XK, if every
distinct S,S ′ ∈ PJS|XK are JS|XK-overlap isolated.
(d) overlap partition: A JS|XK-overlap isolated partition
PJS|XK is called JS|XK-overlap partition if each S ∈
PJS|XK is JS|XK-overlap connected;
(e) maximin information: Let P∗JS|XK be the finest JS|XK-
overlap partition with the largest size |P∗JS|XK|. Such
partition is unique. The maximin information is defined
as
I∗(S;X) = log |P∗JS|XK|.
The maximin information I∗(S;X) measures the ‘refined’
knowledge [15, Section III-B], or the highest resolution, on the
range JSK by observing X . We show in the next subsection
that I∗(S;X) indicates the non-stochastic distinguishability in
the view of privacy.
C. L0(S → X), I∗(S;X), k-anonymity and Non-stochastic
Distinguishability
For the release of tabular data, k-anonymity was proposed in
[12] to guarantee that an adversary cannot distinguish between
at least k rows of the record for each instance of the released
data.
Definition 2 (k-anonymity). JS|XK is k-anonymous if
|JS|xK| ≥ k for all x ∈ JXK.
The method for attaining k-anonymity is to ensure k-
occurrences of the records |JS|xK| = k for each x in the
released table.5 A straightforward result from Definition 2
is the one-to-one correspondence between L0 and the k-
anonymity.
Lemma 1 (L0 ⇐⇒ k-anonymity). JS|XK is k-anonymous if
and only if B0(S|X) ≥ log k or L0(S → X) ≤ log(|JSK|/k).
While L0 or the k-anonymity denotes the non-stochastic
uncertainty reduction, I∗(S;X) measures the non-stochastic
distinguishability. In [14], the non-stochastic privacy is mea-
sured as the change of the range of the public data |JX|sK \JX|s′Kunionsq JX|s′K \ JX|sK| conditioned on two distinct sensitive
uv values s and s′. Here, |JX|sK \ JX|s′K unionsq JX|s′K \ JX|sK|
measures the distinguishability between s and s′ (the lower
the value, the less distinguishable and the more privacy). This
can be viewed as a non-stochastic version of the differential
privacy (DP) [4]. Clearly, if I∗(S;X) > 0, there are at least
two non-overlapping/disjoint S,S ′ ( P∗JS|XK such that an
adversary can discriminate perfectly any pair of s ∈ S and
s′ ∈ S ′ by observing X .6 In this case, any distinguishability-
based privacy measure is minimized (no privacy). It also
relates to the zero-error capacity [24]: I∗(S;X) is the largest
information amount (in bits) of S that can be conveyed without
any error by transmitting X [15, Theorem 4.1]. In addition,
we can prove the following relationship between I∗ and L0.
The proof is presented in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. I∗(S;X) ≤ L0(S → X).
This means that L0(S → X) could be nonzero when 0 =
I∗(S;X), i.e., even if the adversary cannot perfectly obtain
some bits of S from X , he/she might still become more certain
about S. Apart from these non-stochastic measures, we show
5The value k in the original definition [12, Definition 3] refers to the number
of records, including k records with the same value of the sensitive data s such
that s ∈ JS|xK. It is shown in [13], [23] that a k-anonymous database with the
identical occurrences of the sensitive variable is subject to the homogeneity
attack [13], [23]. This does not apply to the k-anonymity in Definition 2,
which is a more strict definition where k refers to the number of distinct
values of S.
6This is because |JX|sK \ JX|s′Kunionsq JX|s′K \ JX|sK| attains the maximum
if JX|sK \ JX|s′K = JX|sK and JX|s′K \ JX|sK = JX|s′K.
4 IEEE JOURNAL
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
public data X
se
ns
iti
ve
da
ta
S
Fig. 1. The joint range JS,XK of uvs S and X with JSK = {s1, . . . , s6} andJXK = {x1, . . . , x7}. A blue square at (si, xj) denotes (si, xj) ∈ JS,XK;
otherwise (si, xj) /∈ JS,XK.
in Section VI how L0 and I∗ relate to stochastic information
theory.
IV. GRAPH DECOMPOSITION FOR DETERMINING I∗(S;X)
Let GX = (JXK, EJS|XK) be an undirected uncapacitated
graph with the node set JXK and the edge set EJS|XK =
{(x, x′) : JS|X = xK ∩ JS|X = x′K 6= ∅}. Here, GX cor-
responds to the adjacency matrix in stochastic information
theory [24] A = [ax,x′ ] where ax,x′ = 1 if ∃s ∈ JSK such
that the joint probabilities p(s, x) and p(s, x′) are both non-
zero and ax,x′ = 0 otherwise. Therefore, GX is also called
the confusability graph [19].7
A decomposition PGX of GX is a partition of JXK such that
any two distinct subgraphs X ,X ′ ∈ PGX are disconnected;
The finest decomposition, denoted by P∗GX , is a decomposition
such that each subgraph X is connected [27]. The following
lemma states the equivalence between graph decomposition
and the JS|XK-overlap partition. The proof is in Appendix B.
Lemma 2. For each decomposition PGX , {JS|X K : X ∈
PGX} is a JS|XK-overlap isolated partition; For the finest
decomposition P∗GX , P∗JS|XK = {JS|X K : X ∈ P∗GX}
is the unique JS|XK-overlap partition so that the maximin
information is I∗[S;X] = log |P∗GX |.
For X ⊆ JXK, let κ(X ) = |{(x, x′) ∈ EJS|XK : x ∈
X , x′ ∈ JXK \ X}| denote the value of the cut {X , JXK \ X}.
The graph GX is decomposable if the min-cut min{κ(X ) :
∅ 6= X ( JXK} = 0. The solution to the min-cut problem
arg min{κ(X ) : ∅ 6= X ( JXK} forms a set lattice [28, Sec-
tion 2.3]8 and can be determined by the max-flow algorithm
[29] in polynomial time. All the smallest min-cut solutions
constitute the finest decomposition [28, Section 2.2]:
P∗GX =
⋂
arg min{κ(X ) : ∅ 6= X ( JXK}.
7The adjacency matrix A in [24] and the corresponding confusability graph
in [19] only depend on whether the joint probability p(s, x) is nonzero or
not. By knowing that each non-zero p(s, x) determines the presence of (s, x)
in JS,XK, the stochastic joint probability p(s, x), ∀s, x can be reduced to
the non-stochastic joint range by JS,XK = {(s, x) : p(s, x) 6= 0}. This
explains that both the Shannon capacity of a graph, the zero-error capacity,
and the maximin information I∗(S,X) are related to the graph theory or
combinatorics [25], [26].
8More precisely, the set T = argmin{κ(X ) : ∅ 6= X ( JXK} unionsq {∅} unionsq
{JXK} is a lattice such that, for any X1,X2 ∈ T , X1 ∩ X2 ∈ T and
X1 ∪ X2 ∈ T .
x2
x4
x1
x3
x5
x6
x7
Fig. 2. The undirected graph GX = (JXK, EJS|XK) based on the conditional
range JS|XK of Fig. 1. Both the min-cut and graph connectivity of GX
is 0, i.e., GX is disconnected, which means I∗(S;X) > 0. The finest
decomposition of GX is P∗GX = {{x1, x2}, {x3, x4}, {x5}, {x6}, {x7}},
which results in I∗(S;X) = log |P∗GX | = log 5.
A simple method to determine P∗GX is to recursively run either
breadth-first search (BFS) or death-first search (DFS) [30]. We
run BFS or DFS staring from any node x ∈ X to find all
other nodes that are reachable (via some path) from x. This
identifies a connected subgraph in P∗GX . Then, we repeat this
procedure for any node that has not been searched until no
such node is left. The complexity of BFS/DFS is O(|JXK|+
|EJS|XK|). The above method calls BFS/DFS for |P∗GX | times
and therefore the complexity is upper bounded by O(|JXK|2 +
|JXK||EJS|XK|).
There are also other methods that determine P∗GX . For
example, one of algorithms in [27], [31], [32] for determining
the network strength.9 The lowest complexity of these algo-
rithms is O(|JXK|) runs of the max-flow algorithm. Without
explicitly constructing the graph GX , we can still obtain the
Laplacian of the confusability matrix to determine the finest
decomposition P∗GX ; see [33, Remark 6]. Note that the validity
of this Laplacian method is due to the inherit relationship be-
tween the maximin information I∗ and Ga´cs-Ko¨rner common
information, which is explained in Section VI.
Example 1. For JSK = {s1, . . . , s6}, JXK = {x1, . . . , x7}
and the joint range JS,XK shown in Fig. 1, we have GX =
(JXK, EJS|XK) in Fig. 2 with the min-cut being 0, i.e., the
graph is decomposable. The finest decomposition P∗GX ={{x1, x2}, {x3, x4}, {x5}, {x6}, {x7}} and the set of all min-
cut solutions can be constructed by the fusion of subsets in
P∗GX :
arg min{κ(X ) : ∅ 6= X ( JXK} ={ ⊔
X∈X
X : X ⊆ P∗GX
}
\ {JXK}.
For example, {x1, . . . , x4} = {x1, x2} unionsq {x3, x4} is a min-
cut solution and so is {x5, x6, x7} = {x5} unionsq {x6} unionsq {x7}.
The finest decomposition P∗GX determines the unique JS|XK-
overlap partition P∗JS|XK = {JS|X K : X ∈ P∗GX} =
{{s1, s2}, {s3}, {s4}, {s4}, {s6}} and thus I∗(S;X) =
log |P∗JS|XK| = log |P∗GX | = log 5.
9If the network strength is nonzero, GX is connected and I(S;X) =
0. However, if the network strength is zero, GX is decomposable and the
algorithms in [27], [31], [32] return the finest decomposition P∗GX [27].
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V. NON-STOCHASTIC PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA
RELEASE
Instead of the original X , the data curator publishes Xˆ ,
a distorted or sanitized version of the public data X . The
problem is how to sanitize the data to preserve privacy, while
keeping the utility of Xˆ above a certain level. In this section,
we formulate the non-stochastic privacy-preserving problem
as the minimization of either of two privacy measures in
Section III, L0(S → Xˆ) or I∗(S; Xˆ), subject to a util-
ity constraint. We consider the Lagrangian function of the
non-stochastic privacy-preserving problem and propose two
agglomerative clustering algorithms to determine Xˆ for the
minimization of L0(S → Xˆ) and I∗(S; Xˆ), respectively. We
also consider the problem of finding a privacy-preserving data
release scheme Xˆ that guarantees the non-stochastic indistin-
guishability, which is formulated as minimizing L0(S → Xˆ)
subject to I∗(S; Xˆ) = 0 and the utility constraint, and
show that this problem can also be solved by the proposed
agglomerative clustering algorithm.
The main objective of the non-stochastic privacy-preserving
problem is to determine JXˆK and the conditional range JXˆ|XK
through a deterministic function f : JXK 7→ JXˆK with |JXK| ≥
|JXˆK|. Here, f can be considered as a quantization function
that clusters/merges all x ∈ JX|xˆK to xˆ = f(x). We use a more
convenient notation for f , the partition Q = {JX|xˆK : xˆ ∈JXˆK}. This privacy-preserving method is captured by the
Markov chain S − X − Xˆ , where, for a given joint rangeJS,XK, a sanitization method JXˆ|XK results in the conditional
range
JS|xˆK = ⋃
x∈JX|xˆKJS|xK = JS|X K, ∀xˆ ∈ JXˆK (1)
for X = JX|xˆK ∈ Q.
A. Minimizing Privacy Leakage L0(S → Xˆ)
For a given threshold θ, consider the problem
minJXˆ|XKL0(S → Xˆ), s.t. Ui(X; Xˆ) ≥ θ. (2)
That is, we aim to maximize the value of k in k-anonymity
(Lemma 1) subject to a constraint on the utility. For the
quantization Q corresponding to JXˆ|XK, we have B0(S|Xˆ) =
minxˆ∈JXˆK log |JS|xˆK| = minX∈Q log |JS|X K|. The Lagrangian
function of (2) is L(JXˆ|XK, λ) = −minX∈Q log |JS|X K| −
λUi(X; Xˆ) for all λ ∈ [0,+∞).
The utility of the released data Xˆ is measured by Ui(X; Xˆ).
We consider two definitions:
Ui(X; Xˆ) =
{
I0(X → Xˆ), i = 1,
−maxx,xˆ : xˆ∈JXˆ|xK d(x, xˆ), i = 2.
The non-stochastic 0-information I0(X → Xˆ) = H0(X) −
maxxˆ∈JXˆK log |JX|xˆK| denotes the minimal posterior entropy
reduction on X , which corresponds to coarsest resolution of
X by observing Xˆ . Therefore, I0(X → Xˆ) indicates the
Algorithm 1: Agglomerative clustering algorithm for solv-
ing problem (2)
input : the Lagrangian multiplier λ ∈ [0,+∞) and the joint
range JS,XK.
output: the quantization Q(t−1).
1 initiate Q(0) := {{x} : x ∈ JXK} and t := 0;
2 repeat
3 Π := arg min{log |JS|X K| : X ∈ Q(t)} ;
4 Q(t+1) := Q(t);
5 t := t+ 1;
6 repeat
7 X ∗ := arg max{Ui(X; Xˆ(t){X ,X ′}) : X ′ ∈ Q(t),X ′ 6=
X , JS|X ′K 6= JS|X K} ;
9 Q(t) := Q(t){X ,X∗};
10 Π := Π \ {X ,X ∗};
11 until Π = ∅;
12 4L := L(JXˆ(t)|XK, λ)− L(JXˆ(t−1)|XK, λ);
13 until 4L ≥ 0 or |Q(t)| = 1;
14 return Q(t−1);
worst-case data utility. So is −maxx,xˆ : xˆ∈JXˆ|xK d(x, xˆ) for the
pairwise distance/distortion10 function d(·, ·).
1) Agglomerative Clustering Algorithm: While problem (2)
is a computationally complex optimization problem, in par-
ticular for large datasets, we propose a greedy agglomerative
clustering in Algorithm 1 that generates a locally optimal JXˆK
and JXˆ|XK by iteratively merging the elements in JXK.
Algorithm 1 starts with Q(0) = {{x} : x ∈ JXK},
which means no quantization. In each iteration t, we
strictly increase minX∈Q(t) log |JS|X K| by merging each X ∈
arg min{log |JS|X K| : X ∈ Q(t)} with another subset X ∗ that
maximize the utility function Ui(X; Xˆ
(t)
{X ,X ′}) over the subsets
X ′ in the current quantization Q(t). We explain how to search
X ∗ in step 7 as follows.
For each distinct pair X1,X2 ∈ Q(t), let the partition
Q(t){X1,X2} = (Q(t) \ {X1,X2}) ∪ {X1 unionsq X2}
be obtained by merging X1 and X2 and Xˆ(t){X1,X2} is the
resulting uv. Consider the utility function U1(X; Xˆ
(t)
{X1,X2}) =
I0(X → Xˆ(t){X1,X2}) = H0(X) − maxX∈Q(t){X1,X2} log |X |.
Because merging X1 and X2 such that JS|X1K = JS|X2K does
not change the value of L0(S → Xˆ(t)), we let
Φ(Q(t)) = {(X1,X2) ∈ Q(t) : X1 6= X2, JS|X1K 6= JS|X2K}
and consider
(X ∗1 ,X ∗2 ) ∈ arg max
(X1,X2)∈Φ(Q(t))
U1(X; Xˆ
(t)
{X1,X2})
= arg min
(X1,X2)∈Φ(Q(t))
max
X∈Q(t){X1,X2}
log |X |
10d(·, ·) could be the `p-norm or any other pairwise dissimilarity measure.
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Here, we have maxX∈Q(t){X1,X2}
log |X | = log (max{|X1|
+|X2|,maxX∈Q(t) |X |}
)
, for which, if |X1| + |X2| ≤
maxX∈Q(t) |X |,∀(X1,X2) ∈ Φ(Q(t)), then
arg min
(X1,X2)∈Φ(Q(t))
max
X∈Q(t){X1,X2}
log |X | = Φ(Q(t));
if there exists (X1,X2) ∈ Φ(Q(t)) such that |X1| + |X2| >
maxX∈Q(t) |X |, then
arg min
(X1,X2)∈Φ(Q(t))
max
X∈Q(t){X1,X2}
log |X |
= arg min
(X1,X2)∈Φ(Q(t))
{|X1|+ |X2|}.
Therefore, we have arg min(X1,X2)∈Φ(Q(t)){|X1| + |X2|} ⊆
arg min(X1,X2)∈Φ(Q(t)) maxX∈Q(t){X1,X2}
log |X |. So, we can
search for
(X ∗1 ,X ∗2 ) ∈ arg min
(X1,X2)∈Φ(Q(t))
{|X1|+ |X2|}.
Therefore, for the utility function U1(X; Xˆ
(t)
{X ,X ′}) = I0(X →
Xˆ
(t)
{X ,X ′}), we choose X ∗ ∈ arg min
{|X unionsq X ′| : X ′ ∈
Q(t),X ′ 6= X , JS|X ′K 6= JS|X K}.
For the utility function U2 = −maxx,xˆ : xˆ∈JXˆ|xK d(x, xˆ), a
unique codeword xˆ is assigned to each cluster X ∈ Q such
that X = JX|xˆK. Two possible choices are the centroid of the
cluster xˆ = 1|X |
∑
x∈X x and xˆ = x for some x ∈ X , but other
choices are possible based on the application. We denote the
maximum distortion for the cluster X ∈ Q by
d¯(X ) = max
x∈X
d(x, xˆ)
and have
(X ∗1 ,X ∗2 ) ∈ arg min
(X1,X2)∈Φ(Q(t))
max
x,xˆ : xˆ∈JXˆ(t){X1,X2}|xK d(x, xˆ)
= arg min
(X1,X2)∈Φ(Q(t))
max
X∈Q(t){X1,X2}
d¯(X )
Here, since maxX∈Q(t){X1,X2}
d¯(X ) = max{d¯(X1 unionsq
X2),maxX∈Q(t) d¯(X )}, arg min(X1,X2)∈Φ(Q(t)) d¯(X1 unionsqX2) ⊆
arg min(X1,X2)∈Φ(Q(t)) maxX∈Q(t){X1,X2}
d¯(X ) and therefore
we choose X ∗ ∈ arg min{d¯(X unionsq X ′) : X ′ ∈ Q(t),X ′ 6=
X , JS|X ′K 6= JS|X K} in step 7.
Example 2. For λ = 0.3, we run Algorithm 1 to the uvs S and
X in Example 1 with the initiation Q(0) = {{x1}, . . . , {x7}}.
Consider the utility function U1(X; Xˆ(t)) = I0(S → Xˆ(t)).
At the first iteration, we have Π = {{x2}, . . . , {x7}}, for
which step 2 to step 11 produce the quantization Q(1) =
{{x1, x2, x7}, {x3, x5}, {x4, x6}} with the conditional rangesJS|{x1, x2, x7}K = {s1, s2, s6}, JS|{x3, x5}K = {s3, s4}
and JS|{x4, x6}K = {s3, s6}. Since 4L = − log 2 +
λ log 3 = −0.5245 < 0, we continue the iterations. At
the second iteration, we have Π = {{x3, x5}, {x4, x6}}
and Q(2) = {{1, 2, 7}, {3, . . . , 6}} after step 11 with
the conditional ranges JS|{x1, x2, x7}K = {s1, s2, s6} andJS|{x3, . . . , x6}K = {s3, s4, s6}, for which 4L = −0.4605 <
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Fig. 3. The convergence performance in terms of L(JXˆ(t)|XK, λ) =
−minX∈Q(t) log |JS|X K| − λUi(X; Xˆ(t)) versus the iteration index t
when Algorithm 1 is applied to solve problem (2). For the utility function
U1(X; Xˆ(t)) = I0(S → Xˆ(t)) and λ = 0.3, the iteration terminates at t =
3; For the utility function U2(X; Xˆ(t)) = −maxx,xˆ : xˆ∈JXˆ(t)|XK d(x, xˆ)
and λ = 2.5, the iteration terminates at t = 1. See Example 2. Both plots
are strictly decreasing.
0. We run the third iteration and have Q(3) = {{x1, . . . , x7}}
returned.
Let the values of x ∈ JXK be
x1 = 0.2, x2 = 0.1, x3 = 0.4, x4 = 0.3,
x5 = 0.6, x6 = 1.5, x7 = 1.
(3)
and run Algorithm 1 for the utility function U2(X; Xˆ(t)) =
−maxx,xˆ : xˆ∈JXˆ(t)|xK d(x, xˆ) and λ = 2.5. At the end
of 1st iteration, we have Π = {{x2}, . . . , {x7}} and
Q(1) = {{x1, x2, x4}, {x3, x5}, {x6, x7}} with the condi-
tional ranges JS|{x1, x2, x4}K = {s1, s2, s3}, JS|{x3, x5}K =
{s3, s4} and JS|{x6, , x7}K = {s5, s6}. Since 4L =
− log 2 + λd¯({x6, x7}) = −0.3750 < 0, we continue
to iteration t = 2 where Π = {{x3, x5}, {x6, x7}}.
But, at step 11, Q(2) = {{x1, x2, x7}, {x3, . . . , x6}} but
4L = − log 3 + λ(d¯({x1, . . . , x7}) − d¯({x6, x7})) =
0.0758 > 0. Iteration terminates and the quantization Q(1) =
{{x1, x2, x7}, {x3, x5}, {x4, x6}} is returned. Algorithm 1
ensures a strict reduction of the Lagrangian function in each
iteration. See Fig. 3.
B. Minimizing the Maximin Information I∗
Consider the problem
minJXˆ|XK I∗(S; Xˆ), s.t. Ui(X; Xˆ) ≥ θ. (4)
The Lagrangian function of (4) is L(JXˆ|XK, λ) = log |P∗GXˆ |−
λUi(X; Xˆ) for λ ∈ [0,+∞). Here, P∗GXˆ is the finest de-
composition of the undirected uncapacitated graph GXˆ =
(JXˆK, EJS|XˆK) for the conditional range JS|XˆK. Based on (1)
and Definition 1, we show below how to obtain PGXˆ fromPGX by a subgraph merging method, the idea of which is
then used to propose the agglomerative clustering algorithm
for solving problem (4).
1) Determining P∗GXˆ : Initiate P
∗
GXˆ
:= P∗GX ; For each X ∈
Q = {JX|xˆK : xˆ ∈ JXˆK}, obtain all the subgraphs in P∗GXˆ that
intersect with X as
GX := {G ∈ P∗GXˆ : G ∩ X 6= ∅}
DING et al.: DEVELOPING NON-STOCHASTIC PRIVACY-PRESERVING POLICIES USING AGGLOMERATIVE CLUSTERING 7
and update P∗GXˆ by fusing all subgraphs in GX to form one
subset G˜X = unionsqG∈GXG, i.e.,
P∗GXˆ := (P
∗
GXˆ
\GX ) ∪ {G˜X }.
The size |P∗GXˆ | is reducing in each iteration and P
∗
GXˆ
is
updated to the finest decomposition of GXˆ = (JXˆK, EJS|XˆK)
at the end such that I∗(S; Xˆ) = log |P∗GXˆ |. For example, forP∗GX = {{x1, x2}, {x3, x4}, {x5}, {x6}, {x7}} in Fig. 2 and
the quantization Q = {{x1, x3}, {x2, x5}, {x4, x6}, {x7}},
we get the finest decomposition PGXˆ = {{x1, . . . , x6}, {x7}}
at the end of the above iterative process (see Fig. 4(c)).
2) Agglomerative Clustering Algorithm: We propose an
agglomerative clustering algorithm in Algorithm 2 for problem
(4), which can be interpreted as an iterative subgraph merging
process. Algorithm 2 starts with Q(0) = {{x} : x ∈ JXK}. In
each iteration t, we have the undirected graph G updated to
GXˆ(t) = (JXˆ(t)K, EJS|Xˆ(t)K) and the partition P(t) updated to
its finest decomposition P∗G
Xˆ(t)
. Here, Xˆ(t) denotes the re-
leased data corresponding to the quantization Q(t). Therefore,
G and P(0) are initiated as GX = (JXK, EJS|XK) and P∗GX ,
respectively.
Algorithm 2 iteratively merge two subsets X ∗1 ,X ∗2 ∈
Q(t) that reduce the Lagrangian function L(JXˆ(t)|XK, λ) the
most (step 4 to step 6). This is done as follows. Consider
the Lagrangian function L(JXˆ(t)|XK, λ) = log |P∗G
Xˆ(t)
| −
λUi(X; Xˆ
(t)). Since merging subsets of Q(t) that belong to
the same subgraph in P(t) = P∗G
Xˆ(t)
does not reduce |P∗G
Xˆ(t)
|
but only reduce utility Ui(X; Xˆ(t)), we can limit the merging
operation to the subsets that belong to disconnected subgraphs
in Q(t). To this end, the set of candidate subsets of Q(t) for
the pairwise merging operation at iteration t is defined as
Ψ(Q(t),P(t)) = {(X1,X2) : X1,X2 ∈ Q(t),X1 6= X2,
∃G1,G2 ∈ P(t),G1 ∩ X1 6= ∅,G2 ∩ X2 6= ∅,G1 6= G2
}
.
We determine the steepest decent direction (X ∗1 ,X ∗2 ) as
the maximizer of maxUi(X; Xˆ
(t)
{X1,X2}) over Ψ(Q(t),P(t)).
As explained Section V-A1, for the utility function
U1(X; Xˆ
(t)
{X1,X2}) = I0(X → Xˆ
(t)
{X1,X2}), we choose
(X ∗1 ,X ∗2 ) ∈ arg min
(X1,X2)∈Ψ(Q(t),P(t))
{|X1|+ |X2|}. (6)
If the minimizer of (6) is not unique, we should choose the pair
(X ∗1 ,X ∗2 ) that connects the largest two subgraphs in P∗G
Xˆ(t)
.
The purpose is to have a smaller minimum of (6) in the
subsequent iterations t′ > t. See the example below. For the
utility function U2 = −maxx,xˆ : xˆ∈JXˆ|xK d(x, xˆ), we chose
(X ∗1 ,X ∗2 ) ∈ arg min
(X1,X2)∈Ψ(Q(t),P(t))
d¯(X1 unionsq X2).
Example 3. For λ = 0.3, we apply Algorithm 2 to the
uvs S and X with the joint range JS,XK in Example 1 to
solve the problem (4) for U1(X; Xˆ) = I0(S → Xˆ). We
initiate Q(0) = {{x1}, . . . , {x7}}, G as the undirected graph
in Fig. 2 and P(0) = {{x1, x2}, {x3, x4}, {x5}, {x6}, {x7}}.
Algorithm 2: Agglomerative clustering algorithm for solv-
ing problem (4)
input : the Lagrangian multiplier λ ∈ [0,+∞) and the joint
range JS,XK.
output: the quantization Q(t), the partition P(t) that determines
the maximin information I∗(S; Xˆ(t)) = log |P(t)| and
the graph G that equals GXˆ(t) = (JXˆ(t)K, EJS|Xˆ(t)K).
1 initiate the quantization Q(0) := {{x} : x ∈ JXK}, the graph
G := GX and the finest decomposition P(0) := P∗GX ;
2 t := 0;
3 while |P(t)| > 1 do
4 Choose a maximizer (X ∗1 ,X ∗2 ) of
max
(X1,X2)∈Ψ(Q(t),P(t))
Ui(X; Xˆ
(t)
{X1,X2}); (5)
5 4L :=
log |P
(t)|−1
|P(t)| − λ(Ui(X; Xˆ
(t)
{X∗1 ,X∗2 }
)− Ui(X; Xˆ(t)));
6 if 4L ≥ 0 then break;
7 Merge nodes X ∗1 and X ∗2 in graph G;
8 Q(t+1) := Q(t){X∗1 ,X∗2 };
9 P(t+1) := P(t){G∗1 ,G∗2}, where G
∗
1 ,G∗2 ∈ P(t) such that
G∗1 ∩ X ∗1 6= ∅ and G∗2 ∩ X ∗2 6= ∅;
10 t := t+ 1;
11 end
12 return Q(t), P(t) and G;
Since ({x1}, {x2}) and ({x3}, {x4}) are already connected,
candidates for pairwise merging are
Ψ(Q(0),P(0)) ={({x}, {x′}) : x, x′ ∈ JXK, x 6= x′}
\ {({x1}, {x2}), ({x3}, {x4})}.
Note that |X1| + |X2| = 2 for all (X1,X2) ∈ Ψ(Q(0),P(0)).
We choose to merge ({x1}, {x3}) that connect the large two
subgraphs {x1, x2} and {x3, x4} in the undirected graph in
Fig. 2. This results in a strict reduction of the Lagrangian
function4L = log2 45−λ log2 21 = −0.0219.11 We get the new
quantization Q(1) = {{x1, x3}, {x2}, {x4}, . . . , {x7}} and
the updated graph G in Fig. 4(a) with the finest decomposition
being P(1) = {{x1, . . . , x4}, {x5}, {x6}, {x7}}. At the 2nd
iteration,
Ψ(Q(1),P(1)) = {(X1,X2) ∈ Q(1) : X1 6= X2}\{
({x1, x3}, {x2}), ({x1, x3}, {x4}), ({x2}, {x4})
}
.
Among the minimizers in arg min
{|X1| + |X2| : (X1,X2) ∈
Ψ(Q(1),P(1))}, we choose ({2}, {5}) that connect the
largest two subgraphs {1, . . . , 4} and {5} and result in
4L < 0. The graph G is updated to Fig. 4(b). We have
Q(2) = {{x1, x3}, {x2, x5}, {x4}, {x6}, {x7}} and P(2) =
{{x1, . . . , x5}, {x6}, {x7}}. Repeating in the same way, we
have Q(3) = {{x1, x3}, {x2, x5}, {x4, x6}, {x7}}, P(3) =
{{x1, . . . , x6}, {x7}} and the updated graph G in Fig. 4(c)
at the end of the 3rd iteration. At the 4th iteration, Q(4) =
11One can show that, if {x5} {x6} is merged at the 1st iteration, we have
min(X1,X2)∈Ψ(Q(2),P(2)){|X1| + |X2|} = 3 at the 3rd iteration. But in
this example, the minimum is 2 when t = 3.
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Fig. 4. In Example 3, the change of the undirected uncapacitated graph G
at the end of each iteration t of Algorithm 2, where |P(t)|, the number of
disconnected subgraphs in G, is reduced from t = 5 to t = 1 and so is
I∗(S; Xˆ(t)) from log2 5 to 0. The subscription of a node in G denotes the
original elements in JXK that are fused to form this super-node, e.g., x13 is
the fusion of x1 and x3.
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Fig. 5. In Example 4, the change of the undirected uncapacitated graph G
of the problem at the end of each iteration t of Algorithm 2, where |P(t)|,
the number of connected subgraphs is reduced from |P(0)| = 5 (see Fig. 2)
to |P(3)| = 2.
{{x1, x3, x7}, {x2, x5}, {x4, x6}}, P(4) = {{x1, . . . , x7}}
are returned.
Example 4. For the values of X in (3), we reset x7 = 4.
Consider the utility function U2 = −maxx,xˆ : xˆ∈JXˆ|xK d(x, xˆ).
We choose the centroid xˆ = 1|X |
∑
x∈X x for X = JX|xˆK
and d(x, xˆ) = ‖x − xˆ‖2 = |x − xˆ|. For λ = 0.3,
we apply Algorithm 2 to the uvs S and X with the joint
range JS,XK in Example 1 to solve the problem (4). We
have the graph G updated as in Fig. 5. At the end of the
third iteration, Q(3) = {{x1, x4}, {x3, x5, x6}, {x2}, {x7}},
P(3) = {{x1, . . . , x6}, {x7}} are returned. In Fig. 6, we plot
the convergence performance of Algorithm 2 in Examples 3
and 4. It can be seen that Algorithm 2 ensures a strict
reduction of the Lagrangian function L(JXˆ(t)|XK, λ) in each
iteration t.
0 1 2 3 4
0
1
2
3
iteration index t
L(
JXˆ(k
) |X
K,λ)
U1
U2
Fig. 6. The convergence performance in terms of L(JXˆ(t)|XK, λ) =
log |P(t)| − λUi(X; Xˆ(t)) versus the iteration index t when Algo-
rithm 2 is applied to solve problem (4) for λ = 0.3. For the util-
ity function U1(X; Xˆ(t)) = I0(S → Xˆ(t)), the iteration terminates
at t = 4 (see Example 3); For the utility function U2(X; Xˆ(t)) =
−maxx,xˆ : xˆ∈JXˆ(t)|xK d(x, xˆ), the iteration terminates at t = 3 (see
Example 4). As guaranteed by Algorithm 2, both plots are strictly decreasing.
C. Minimizing L0(S → Xˆ) and Restricting I∗(S;X) = 0
As discussed in Section III-C, we have L0(S → Xˆ) −
I∗(S; Xˆ) ≥ 0, where I∗(S; Xˆ) can be considered as the
most bits in the leakage L0(S → Xˆ) that can be esti-
mated/distinguished by an adversary without error. Also, due
to the fact that the privacy leakage L0(S → Xˆ) could be
nonzero when I∗(S; Xˆ) = 0, it is worth considering the
problem of how to find a data release scheme that ensures
the non-stochastic indistinguishability
minJXˆ|XKL0(S → Xˆ), s.t. I∗(S;X) = 0, Ui(X; Xˆ) ≥ θ. (7)
In (7), we assume that θ ≥ minJXˆ|XK : I∗(S;Xˆ)=0 Ui(X; Xˆ).12
The Lagrangian function is
L(JS|XK, λ′, λ) =
− min
X∈Q
log |JS|X K|+ λ′ log |PGXˆ | − λUi(X; Xˆ) (8)
for λ′, λ ≥ 0. The same as Algorithm 2, the steepest de-
cent direction (X ∗1 ,X ∗2 ) can still be searched over the set
Ψ(P(t),Q(t)), but the iteration should repeat until |P(t)| = 1.
The resulting algorithm is the same as Algorithm 2 except that
steps 4 to 6 are replaced by
(X ∗1 ,X ∗2 ) := arg min
(X1,X2)∈Ψ(P(t),Q(t))
4L, (9)
where
4L = − min
X∈Q(t){X1,X2}
log |JS|X K|+ min
X∈Q(t)
log |JS|X K|
+ λ(Ui(X; Xˆ
(t))− Ui(X; Xˆ(t){X1,X2})).
If the minimizers of (9) is not unique, we choose (X ∗1 ,X ∗2 )
with the minimum |JS|X ∗1 K| and |JS|X ∗2 K|. Note, the above
method ensures a strict reduction of I∗(S; Xˆ(t)) for each
iteration t, which is equivalent to the case λ′  λ.
Example 5. We apply the above method to the uvs S and X
in Example 1 for the utility function U1(X; Xˆ) = I0(S → Xˆ
and λ = 0.3. Starting with Q(0) = {{x1}, . . . , {x7}} and
12This is to ensure a nonempty feasible region for (7). The proposed
clustering algorithm based on the Lagrangian function (8) does not require
the value of minJXˆ|XK : I∗(S;Xˆ)=0 Ui(X; Xˆ) in advance, since the returned
solution Xˆ for any given λ is always feasible.
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P(0) = {{x1, x2}, {x3, x4}, {x5}, {x6}, {x7}}, at the first it-
eration, we have arg min{4L : (X1,X2) ∈ Ψ(P(0),Q(0))} =
Ψ(P(0),Q(0)), where we choose (X ∗1 ,X ∗2 ) = ({2}, {3}) such
that |JS|{2}K| = |JS|{3}K| = 2 are the largest subgraphs.
We then have Q(1) = {{x1}, {x2, x3}, {x4}, . . . , {x7}}
and P(1) = {{x1, . . . , x4}, {x5}, {x6}, {x7}}. At the
second iteration, we choose (X ∗1 ,X ∗2 ) = ({x4}, {x5})
and have Q(2) = {{x1}, {x2, x3}, {x4, x5}, {x6}, {x7}}
and P(2) = {{x1, . . . , x5}, {x6}, {x7}}. At the third it-
eration, we have (X ∗1 ,X ∗2 ) = ({x6}, {x7}) so that
Q(3) = {{x1}, {x2, x3}, {x4, x5}, {x6, x7}} and P(3) =
{{x1, . . . , x5}, {x6, x7}}. At the fourth iteration, there are
only two subgraphs {x1, . . . , x5} and {x6, x7} in GXˆ(t) .
We have (X ∗1 ,X ∗2 ) = ({x1}, {x6, x7}) so that |P(4)| =
|{{x1, . . . , x7}}| = 1 finally. The quantization method Q(4) =
{{x1, x6, x7}, {x2, x3}, {x4, x5}} is returned.
Note, when the sensitive data S is also observable or
available, the data curator can sanitize the data by quantizing
the joint range JS,XK. It can be modeled by Markov chain
S−Y −Yˆ , where Y = (S,X) denotes the public data and Yˆ is
its sanitization. The purpose is to search a privacy-preserving
quantization function f : JY K 7→ JYˆ K that determines JYˆ |Y K,
for which, the proposed algorithms in this section also apply
by replacing X and Xˆ with Y and Yˆ , respectively.
It is also easy to extend to a system model where
the adversary has side information A. With the range of
the sensitive data S conditioned on A before and af-
ter the data release Xˆ denoted by JS|AK and JS|Xˆ, AK,
respectively, the privacy leakage L0(S → Xˆ|A) =
max(xˆ,a)∈JXˆ,AK log |JS|aK||JS|xˆ,aK| and the maximin information
I∗(S; Xˆ, A) = log |P∗JS|Xˆ,AK| can be used as the privacy
measures. Here, P∗JS|Xˆ,AK refers to the finest decomposition of
the undirected graph GX,A = (JX,AK, EJS|X,AK). In this case,
we are instead considering the problem minJXˆ|XK L0(S →
Xˆ|A) or I∗(S; Xˆ, A), s.t. Ui(X; Xˆ) ≥ θ, the solution to
which can also be searched by Algorithm 1 or 2.
VI. NOTES ON STOCHASTIC INFORMATION-THEORETIC
PRIVACY AND DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
The studies on privacy in traditional (i.e., stochastic) in-
formation theory [7], [8] consider random variables (rvs)
S and X , and assumes that an adversary infers statistical
knowledge on S via X . By considering the correlation, the
joint probability p(s, x),∀s, x, between the private and public
data, the problem is to design a private encoder/channel
p(xˆ|x),∀x, xˆ that minimizes privacy leakage, but maintains
some level of data utility. This framework is also captured
by the Markov chain S − X − Xˆ , where p(xˆ|x) is called
the privacy funnel [34]. The design of the privacy funnel
p(xˆ|x) is shown to be an opposite optimization problem to the
information bottleneck13 [35], [36]. The idea of Algorithms 1
and 2 in this paper is analogous to the agglomerative pairwise
merge algorithms in [34], [36]. Similar to L0(S → Xˆ),
privacy in information theory is measured in terms of the
13For the utility function Ex,xˆ[d(x, xˆ)], the information bottleneck gener-
alizes the rate-distortion problem in information theory [35].
logarithm of the fraction between the prior and posterior
statistical uncertainty on S. For example, the average inference
loss defined as H(S) − H(S|Xˆ), or the mutual information
I(S; Xˆ), is extended to the worst case H(S)−maxxˆH(S|xˆ)
[7] and the α-leakage [9], [37], where the latter is a tunable
measure of the mutual information.
A. Privacy Leakage L0 and Stochastic Privacy Measures
Let S be a uniformly distributed rv and consider the
maximization of Re´nyi divergence Dα(p(s|xˆ)‖p(s)) =
1
α−1 log
∑
xˆ
pα(s|xˆ)
pα−1(s) in the order of α = 0 over all xˆ ∈ JXˆK.
We have
max
xˆ∈JXˆKD0(p(s|xˆ)‖p(s)) = maxxˆ∈JXˆK− log
∑
s : p(s|xˆ)>0
p(s)
= max
xˆ∈JXˆK− log
∑
s : p(s|xˆ)>0
1
|JSK|
= max
xˆ∈JXˆK log
|JSK|
|JS|xˆK|
= L0(S → Xˆ).
(10)
When the order α→∞,
max
xˆ∈JXˆKD∞(p(s|xˆ)‖p(s)) = max(s,xˆ)∈JS,XˆK log
p(s|xˆ)
p(s)
= D∞(p(s, xˆ)‖p(s)p(xˆ)) = Lr(S → Xˆ).
Here, Lr(S → Xˆ) is called the maximal realizable leakage
in [38, Definition 8]. It is also shown in [7, Definition 6 and
Theorem 3] that if
max
(s,xˆ)∈JS,XˆK
∣∣∣ log p(s|xˆ)
p(s)
∣∣∣ = , (11)
the randomization p(xˆ|s) is at least 2-locally differential
private (2-LDP)14.
In [38, Theorem 1], the stochastic maximal leakage L(S →
Xˆ) is defined and shown to be equivalent to the Sibson
mutual information I∞(S; Xˆ), which is upper bounded as
L(S → Xˆ) ≤ Lr(S → Xˆ) [38, Section VI-B]. Meanwhile, a
more general measure, the maximal α-leakage Lmaxα (S → Xˆ),
was proposed in [9, Definition 6] based on the Arimoto
mutual information, which reduces to the maximal leakage
Lmax∞ (S → Xˆ) = L(S → Xˆ) when the order α → ∞ [9,
Theorem 2]. It is also shown in [9, Theorem 2] that when
α = 1, the maximal α-leakage Lmaxα (S → Xˆ) reduces to
Shannon mutual information I(S; Xˆ), which was used as the
privacy measure, called synergistic disclosure capacity, in [41,
Definition 2]. The mutual information I(S; Xˆ) is equivalent
to the f -information If (S; Xˆ), e.g., used in [42], in the case
of f(t) = t log t.
14A data release scheme p(x|s) is -LDP if p(x|s)/p(x|s′) ≤ e, ∀x, s, s′
[39]. Note that LDP is equivalent to DP [4] without the constraint on the
Hamming distance dH(s, s′) ≤ 1. This definition is adopted in information
theory, e.g., [40].
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B. Maximin Information I∗ and Ga´cs-Ko¨rner Common Infor-
mation
The maximin information I∗(S; Xˆ) is related to the Ga´cs-
Ko¨rner common information [20]:
K(S; Xˆ) = −
∑
S∈JS|XˆK∗
p(S) log p(S),
where p(S) = ∑s∈S,xˆ∈JXˆ|sK p(s, xˆ) and JS, XˆK =
{(s, xˆ) : p(s, xˆ) 6= 0}. Note that I∗(S; Xˆ) =
maxp(s,xˆ),∀s,xˆK(S; Xˆ) and therefore K(S; Xˆ) denotes
the number of bits in S that can be perfectly received by
the adversary via the privacy funnel p(xˆ|x). The sample
complexity15 for empirically learning the value K(S; Xˆ) [43,
Proposition 2] also applies to I∗(S; Xˆ).
Similar to I∗(S; Xˆ) ≤ L0(S → Xˆ), we have K(S; Xˆ) ≤
I(S; Xˆ) [20], [44]. This means that, as long as I(S; Xˆ) > 0,
minimizing I(S; Xˆ), or any other stronger privacy leakage,
e.g., the maximal leakage [38], does not necessarily ensure
K(S; Xˆ) = 0. On the other hand, the case I∗(S; Xˆ) > 0
indicates that the LDP [4] is unattainable. This is because there
exists an x such that log(p(x|s)/p(x|s′))→∞ for some pair
of s and s′.
Note that, in stochastic information theory, perfect privacy
[45], [46] refers to the independence S ⊥ Xˆ , i.e., p(s|xˆ) =
p(s),∀xˆ. In this case, I(S; Xˆ) = 0 so that K(S; Xˆ) = 0,
necessarily. Although the condition K(S; Xˆ) = 0 alone does
not guarantee perfect privacy16, the value of the Ga´cs-Ko¨rner
common information indicates an upper bound on the utility
of the released data in the case of the perfect privacy (see [8]).
The case S ⊥ Xˆ corresponds to non-stochastic independenceJS|xˆK = JSK,∀xˆ, where I0(S → Xˆ) = L0(S → Xˆ) = 0
and I∗(S; Xˆ) = 0. But, since I∗(S; Xˆ) ≤ L0(S → Xˆ),
I∗(S; Xˆ) = 0 does not guarantee JS|xˆK = JSK,∀xˆ, either. See
also [15, Fig. 5]. Therefore, the solution to problem (7) is not
necessarily a data release scheme with perfect non-stochastic
privacy.
VII. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we run experiments to show the performance
of Algorithm 1 and 2 proposed in Section V. First, we show
the Pareto frontier of Example 1 to explain how to search the
solution to problems (2), (4) and (7). Then, we present both the
convergence performance and Pareto frontier of Algorithms 1
and 2 when they are applied to the real-world dataset.
A. Pareto Frontier
The Lagrangian function L(JXˆ|XK, λ) can be considered
as the weighted-sum of two objective functions: the privacy
leakage I∗(S; Xˆ), or L0(S → Xˆ), and the utility loss
15The sample complexity derived in [43, Proposition 2] applies to learning
the Hirschfeld-Gebelein-Re´nyi (HGR) maximal correlation function, which
determines K(S; Xˆ) [33, Corollary 3, Remark 6] and therefore applies to
I∗(S; Xˆ).
16The interpretation is that even if the DP is attainable, the information
leakage could be nonzero.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
utility loss: 1− U1(X;Xˆ)
U1(X;X)
or U2(X;Xˆ)
Uˆ2(X;Xˆ)
pr
iv
ac
y
le
ak
ag
e
I ∗
(S
;Xˆ
)/
I ∗
(S
;X
)
for problem (4) when U1(S; Xˆ)
solution determined in Example 3
for problem (4) when U2(S; Xˆ)
solution determined in Example 4
Fig. 7. Pareto frontier for problem (4) for both utility functions U1(S; Xˆ) =
I0(X → Xˆ) and U2(S; Xˆ) = −maxx,xˆ : xˆ∈JXˆ|xK d(x, xˆ). Note, both
privacy and utility measures are normalized. For U1(S; Xˆ), the horizontal
axis is 1 − U1(X;Xˆ)
U1(X;X)
= 1 − I0(X→Xˆ)
H0(X)
; For U1(S; Xˆ), the horizontal axis
is U2(X;Xˆ)
Uˆ2(X;Xˆ)
, where Uˆ2(X; Xˆ) is the minimum value of U2(X; Xˆ) over all
points in the Pareto frontier.
−Ui(X; Xˆ). They form the PUT: minimizing one neces-
sarily increases the other. In this case, the minimizer of
the problem minJXˆ|XK L(JXˆ|XK, λ) for each value of λ
produces a Pareto optimal pair {I∗(S; Xˆ),−Ui(X; Xˆ)}, or
{L0(S → Xˆ),−Ui(X; Xˆ)}, indicating the smallest privacy
leakage I∗(S; Xˆ) or L0(S → Xˆ) that can be attained by the
design of the mapping JXˆ|XK to maintain certain level θ of
Ui(X; Xˆ) and vice versa [47]. The Pareto optimal pair for
all value of λ forms the Pareto frontier.
Fig. 7 shows the examples of the Pareto frontier for the
problem (4), where we can see the solutions obtained in
Examples 3 and 4. Taking the solution in Example 3 for
example. It corresponds to the pair: I∗(S; Xˆ) = 0 and
I0(X; Xˆ) = log 7/3, which states that, to maintain the utility
no less than log 7/3, we can reduce the privacy leakage
I∗(S; Xˆ) to zero. When applying the algorithms proposed in
this paper to the real-world dataset, enumerate λ to obtain the
Pareto frontier. For given utility threshold θ, search the Pareto
frontier for the minimal privacy leakage and the corresponding
solution JXˆ|XK.
B. Hungarian Heart Disease Dataset
This experiment is based on the heart disease data set
created by the Hungarian Institute of Cardiology, Budapest,
in the UCI machine learning repository [48]. It records 293
patients’ data of 76 attributes for the purpose of identifying the
presence of heart disease. We extract the column ‘age’ as the
sensitive data S and ‘serum cholesterol (mg/dl)’ as the public
data X . The marginal range JSK contains 38 distinct values of
age and JXK contains 154 cholesterol levels. The joint rangeJS,XK contains 281 distinct values of (s, x), among which
269 values appear only once in the whole dataset. Note that
this is a typical example that the size of released dataset may
not be large enough to reveal the true statistics of the data. In
this case, each data record often releases a new value of (s, x)
and the adversary only infers the supports or cardinalities of
the alphabets S and X , not the probability or data statistics.
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Fig. 8. The convergence performance in terms of L(JXˆ(t)|XK, λ) versus the iteration index t when Algorithms 1 and 2 are applied to the Hungarian heart dis-
ease dataset in [48] for solving problems (2) and (4), respectively. Here, U1(X; Xˆ(t)) = I0(S → Xˆ(t)) and U2(X; Xˆ(t)) = −maxx,xˆ : xˆ∈JXˆ(t)|xK d(x, xˆ).
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suppression algorithm for attaining the 5-anonymity in [49, Section 3.1] and the submodularity-based agglomerative clustering algorithm in [50, Algorithm 1].
Therefore, the variables S and X can be treated as uncertain
variables and the information can be directly obtained from the
ranges of S and X by the non-stochastic information measures
in Section III.
Fig. 8 shows that Algorithms 1 and 2 converge to the locally
optimal solutions to problems (2) and (4), respectively. Fig. 9
shows the Pareto frontier searched by Algorithms 1 and 2 by
enumerating the value of Lagrangian multiplier λ.
Because of the equivalence of k-anonymity and L0 in
Lemma 1, we also run the generalization-and-suppression
method proposed [49, Section 3.1] for attaining the k-
anonymity for k = 5. The idea is to search for all x associated
with less than 5 values of s and merge them to a new but
less specific value, which is exactly the same idea as the
agglomerative clustering algorithms proposed in this paper.
The only difference is that the generalization-and-suppression
method does not guarantee a certain level of utility, which
means it may sacrifice too much data utility to attain the k-
anonymity. As shown in Fig. 9, the solution determined by
Algorithm 1 outperforms the generalization-and-suppression
method proposed in [49, Section 3.1] in that it incurs a lower
utility loss, or maintains a higher level of usefulness in the
released dataset.17
For problem (4), we run the submodularity-based agglomer-
ative clustering algorithm proposed in [50, Algorithm 1] and
compare with Algorithm 2 in the Pareto frontier in Fig. 9.
17It can be seen by comparing to the blue star searched by Algorithm 1
on the left-hand side of the green pentagon determined by the generalization-
and-suppression method proposed in [49, Section 3.1].
It can be seen that Algorithm 2 is able to search a solution
that Pareto dominates [50, Algorithm 1]: One can find several
points determined by Algorithm 2 with both privacy leakage
and utility loss strictly less than the solution searched by [50,
Algorithm 1]. This is because the problem under concern is not
submodular18 and therefore submodularity-based algorithms
may not be superior to greedy ones.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of how to quantize the public
data X into Xˆ to minimize the non-stochastic information
leakage of the private data S but guarantee a certain level
of the data utility. For the privacy measures L0(S → Xˆ)
and I∗(S;X), two agglomerative clustering algorithms were
proposed, respectively, both of which generate a solutionJXˆ|XK by recursively merging two elements in JXK that
strictly reduces the Lagrangian function. We showed that
L0(S → Xˆ) measures the maximum (worst-case) posterior
range/uncertainty reduction on S at the adversary side and
I∗(S; Xˆ) denotes how distinguishable S is by observing Xˆ .
We then applied the clustering algorithm for minimizing
I∗(S;X) to search for a Xˆ that guarantees non-stochastic
indistinguishability I∗(S; Xˆ) = 0 but minimizes L0(S → Xˆ)
18The validity and efficiency of the agglomerative clustering algorithm
in [50, Algorithm 1] is based on the submodularity of the Lagrangian
function. However, in this paper, the Lagrangian function L(JXˆ(t)|XK, λ)
for both privacy measures I∗ and L0 does not exhibit submodularity or
supermodularity. One can prove by counter-examples based on the definition
of submodularity in [28], [51].
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subject to some utility constraint. It is shown that the value
of I∗(S; Xˆ) is equal to the maximum number of disconnected
subgraphs in the confusability graph, which can be determined
by the min-cut or optimal network attack algorithms. This
gives a visualization of the clustering algorithm for minimizing
I∗(S;X) (Algorithm 2) as a subgraph merging process.
There are some aspects in this paper that can be further
explored. First, the proposed greedy clustering algorithms
only converge to a local optimum and have the complex-
ity O(|JXK|3). It is worth discussing how to improve the
accuracy and efficiency. Second, based on Section VI, we
can combine the results in stochastic and non-stochastic
information-theoretic privacy in real applications, e.g., adopt
non-stochastic measure L0(S → Xˆ) at the beginning of
the data release and then switch19 to stochastic measure
maxxˆ∈JXˆKDα(p(s|xˆ)‖p(s)), which is done by increasing α
from 0 based on (10), or start with I∗(S; Xˆ) and switch to
K(S; Xˆ). In addition, the non-stochastic privacy measures
can also be utilized to design stochastic privacy-preserving
mechanisms: determining the optimal transition probability as
well as the optimal alphabet size.20 Third, the same as the
Ga´cs-Ko¨rner common information, the maximin information
is zero in most cases. Therefore, it is of interest to consider
other non-stochastic measure of the common information, e.g.,
to propose a non-stochastic version of the Wyner’s common
information in [55], and explore its role in perfect privacy.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
For the finest JS|XK-overlap partition P∗JS|XK and the
maximin information I∗(S;X) = log |P∗JS|XK|, we have the
Hartley entropy of S being
H0(S) = log |JSK|
= log
∑
S∈P∗JS|XK
|S|
= I∗(S;X) + log
( 1
|P∗JS|XK|
∑
S∈P∗JS|XK
|S|
)
≥ I∗(S;X) + log minS∈P∗JS|XK |S|
≥ I∗(S;X) + log min
x∈JXK |JS|xK|.
(12)
This proves I∗(S;X) ≤ log |JSK|minx∈JXK |JS|xK| =
maxx∈JXK log |JSK||JS|xK| = L0(S → X). Note that the
inequality K(S;X) ≤ I(S;X) [20], [44] (see Section VI)
19For example, change to a stochastic measure when the amount of the
released data is enough (say, 5000 tabular records). In this case, it is also
crucial to determine the optimal switching time.
20Most stochastic privacy-preserving solutions only determine the optimal
transition probability p(xˆ|x) for fixed size of JXˆK, e.g., the variational method
in [35] for information bottleneck, the BlahutArimoto algorithm in [52] for
rate-distortion. An iterative approach can be proposed by combining these
methods with Algorithms 1 and 2 to first determine the optimal alphabetJXˆK, then the optimal transition probability p(xˆ|x) (see also the deterministic
annealing method in [53]). A related study can be found in [54], which shows
how, in information bottleneck, the error of empirical mutual information is
upper bounded by the alphabet size.
describing the relation between the Ga´cs-Ko¨rner common
information K(S;X) and Shannon mutual information
I(S;X) in stochastic information theory can be proved in
the same way as (12) based on the Jensen’s inequality.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
For X ⊆ JXK, denote JS|X K = ⋃x∈X JS|X = xK. Since
there is no edge connecting any distinct subgraphs X ,X ′ ∈
PJXK, i.e., JS|X K ∩ JS|X ′K = ∅, and ⋃X∈PJXKJS|X K =⋃
x∈JXKJS|X = xK = JSK. So, {JS|X K : X ∈ PGX} for every
PGX is a partition of JSK. For any two points x ∈ X and
x′ ∈ X ′ such that X ,X ′ are two distinct subgraphs in PGX ,
there does not exist a path, denoted by an ordered sequence
(x1, . . . , xn), such that x1 = x and xn = x′ and (xi, xi+1) ∈
EJS|XK, i.e., JS|X = xiK∩JS|X = xi+1K 6= ∅. This means any
s ∈ JS|X = xK ⊆ JS|X K and s′ ∈ JS|X = x′K ⊆ JS|X ′K are
overlap isolated. Therefore, PGX is a JS|XK-overlap isolated
partition In the finest decomposition P∗GX , for each X ∈ P∗GX ,
every pair x, x′ ∈ X are connected, i.e., there exists a path
(x1 = x, . . . , xn = x
′) such that (xi, xi+1) ∈ EJS|XK orJS|X = xiK∩ JS|X = xi+1K 6= ∅. Then, we have s! s′ for
any two s, s′ ∈ JS|X K. So, {JS|X K : X ∈ P∗GX} is JS|XK-
overlap partition and also the finest one since it can not be
further decomposed.
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